On Moeed Yusuf and the Uighur "non-issue": was it worth it?

My one question whenever something like this happens is: was it worth it? 

Let's step back for a second. In academic circles, especially for poli sci/IR people, there is a lot of discussion about whether our work does influence policymakers, whether it should influence policymakers, and what we can do to increase our influence on policymakers. There is a LOT of back and forth on these questions. 

I have always had a pretty skeptical view of all this policy relevance stuff. The last 15% of IR journal articles, where the supposed "policy implications" of the research are laid out, are often painful to read; my most common reaction to these sections is usually "uh huh, right, sure" or "are you being serious?" In some cases, academics will do research on intensely pressing questions of concern to policymakers in the here and now, but these are rare instances, and even when this happens, the transition from a carefully crafted research design to fairly speculative and pie-in-the-sky applications of the research can give readers whiplash. No sir, your paired comparison of recruitment of child soldiers in Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast does NOT give us insight about People's Liberation Army launching a coup (this is an exaggeration but only just). 

Anyway, the point is that some people feel pretty strongly in the other direction, which is that the real-world application of research matters more than anything else. Most of us get into this business because we care deeply about the world around us. Wouldn't you want to affect it, for the better? That is the logic anyway.

Which brings me to Moeed Yusuf. I should say for full disclosure that I kinda know Moeed (but not well): we've met maybe a handful of times (3-4 times in the last decade), usually at some seminar or conference in DC. I've always found him to be a good dude. Personally, he's a nice guy (he didn't complain despite me making him wait 20 mins at Ravi Kabob). Professionally, he's proper. Analytically, I found him to be a dove on Pakistan's two most problematic relationships in the last decade and a half (U.S., India). 

When someone like Moeed takes a job like the one he did, the idea is generally: I can make a difference. I will swallow my misgivings about the bad things my boss(es) is/are doing because I want to make them less bad and the best way to make them less bad is actually be in the room. From the so-called "adults in the room" in the Trump administration (Kelly, Mattis etc) to Moeed, this appears to be the logic. 

The thing is, it is generally quite hard to see what difference people like Moeed (or Mattis) actually make to the end product. As far as I can see, and I am certainly not privy to the inside workings of the establishment so take this with a grain of salt, the foreign and security policies of Pakistan have shown a remarkable level of continuity from before Moeed took the job. Maybe there is a lot going on behind the scenes and in fact he has made a difference. But it's not immediately evident, let's put it that way.

And the costs? Well those are plain. When you take this type of position, I think you think "Yes, I will have to say and do things I don't believe in, but overall I making it better." But if the second half of the sentence is not operative, and the first half definitely is, is that a good deal? 


The single best thing about being an academic is being able to say what you want without fear of retribution. The ivory tower and tenure often come under harsh criticism, but to me, there is something so damn liberating about not having to satisfy any masters/donors/middle management. The flip side is that most or all of what you're saying falls on deaf ears. 

So the trade off appears to be: maintain your integrity but not importance, or be a bit important and sacrifice some integrity. Different individuals will place themselves at different points on this integrity-importance line. 

All I'm saying is that if a guy with a PhD in poli sci is forced to say something like "the Uighurs are a non-issue," then you have probably taken the wrong position on that line. Even accounting for his position and his job title, he could have handled it differently. He could have said something like "It is the position of the government of Pakistan that this is an internal matter for China, and as China's friend and ally, we do not comment on its internal matters." 

In a closely parallel universe, Moeed could easily have finagled this SAPM gig into a cushy "Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations" type position or "Associate Professor of Practice" at the Kennedy School or SIPA a year or two down the road. Maybe he still can. But "the Uighurs are a non issue" is the type of sentence that follows you around. Forgetting the professional stakes, the more important thing to me is how one justifies a statement like that to oneself. How do you look in the mirror every day knowing you said that? He can't possibly believe that prison camps (sorry, "re-education camps") for millions of people is okay. So I return to my question.

Was it worth it?

Comments

  1. Procedure & due process, truth & honesty, these may make progress slow but there is no substitute for them if the end goal is righteous.
    Narrow self interest even if called national interest is never an acceptable excuse for dishonesty or deceit.

    ReplyDelete

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