The predictably dumb response to PTM

The difference between a security state and a non-security state has been made evident in Pakistan's response to PTM. The PTM is not a separatist group, like the BLA. It is not a revolutionary organization, like the Taliban. It is not a mafioso party, like the MQM. There is literally no reason to even contemplate violence and thuggishness against it because it is a peaceful movement demanding normal things.

Yet the Pakistani state is incapable of conceiving of a challenge to the security establishment in anything but ham-handed ways because the security establishment is in charge of figuring out challenges to itself. In a non-security state, a widespread movement for rights and due process would be dealt with some combination of parliamentary committees, political outreach, judicial reform, photo ops, and yes, some role for law enforcement or security agencies (not to the exclusion to everyone else but as one contributing voice). In a security state, not least one prone to centralizing nationalist mythology and Bonapartist whiff-of-grapeshot fantasies, the answer is: submission on our terms. So you escalate, first with the #hybrid5thgenerationwarfare folks, cries of "traitor" and "fifth column," and then with murders in custody, shootings at convoys, and arresting activists.

That they bear unfair and overly aggressive violence at the hands of the state is the entire point of the PTM movement. So the genius solution is to treat it with unfair and overly aggressive violence? Word?

One thing worth speculating on is where this is all going to go. As I see it, two things are impossible:

1. A horizontal escalation of goals. PTM can be fairly termed a Pasthun nationalist organization but harbor no desire for autonomy or statehood, only respect and recognition. Black Lives Matter is a good analogy; closer to home, Mohajir nationalism post-Bhutto but pre-MQM also rings a bell. The point being, something like "we want a Pashtun state" or "Death to the Durand line" is just not what they're interested in at all.

2. A vertical escalation. One thing that is clear is that Manzoor Pashteen (all 24 years of him, remember) understands the moral force behind nonviolence. Even if more "radical" elements within the movement are encouraged by state coercion to tether more loosely to nonviolence, I reckon Manzoor sticks to it. Of course, if he is martyred, all bets are off.

Beyond those two certainties, I really don't know. One escalation that wouldn't surprise me: more rhetoric along the lines of "Punjab domination" with more symbolic and/or substantive alliances formed with nationalists in Balochistan (toxic politically but more fertile ground for a "small provinces" alliance) and/or Sindh (less important or non-force nationally but safer ground to tread for the likes of PTM).

My larger point is that if your bet is you can squash this like a bug and people will just live it...I'd like to be on the other side of that bet. There are more than 35 million Pashtuns in Pakistan. They are the second largest ethnic group in the country and the second largest in the biggest city too. They are deeply interwoven into the fabric of the state, from driving trucks up and down the country to commanding brigades and battalions. Every dumb thing the state does to PTM, a movement with representation in the National Assembly, makes it more attractive to at least some subset of those people.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

On the cancelled LUMS conference and the noxious Ejaz Haider

My 15 worst travel experiences on a Pakistani passport (Part 1)

My 15 worst travel experiences on a Pakistani passport (Part 2)