The smoking, radiating ruin of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy

For many years during the height of the so-called War on Terror, GHQ defended its decision-making re: Afghanistan/the Taliban/the double game/"do more" with a three-fold argument:

1-Pakistan will be next to Afghanistan a lot longer than America will be in it

2-Given #1, maintaining leverage over, and control of, the ruling regime on the western border is in Pakistan's interests, mainly due to the existential threat emanating from the eastern one

3-The regime of choice to deliver the security benefits in #2 is the Taliban

To recall, the main costs of the policy predicated on the above claims were (a) Pakistani lives (somewhere between fifty and one hundred thousand dead), (b) Pakistan's reputation in Afghanistan and amongst a new generation of ordinary Afghans, and (c) Pakistan's reputation in DC. No one, even at the time, was unaware of these costs. Indeed, there is very good evidence that GHQ was deeply cognizant of each of these costs and yet considered them worth it. We have important people saying it on the record. Some went on TV and called it "collateral damage," just to refresh some memories. Others talked to Steve Coll off the record. Yet others sent the President of the United States a 15-page (single-space?) letter. Either way, we were all there and we remember what they said. 

Now, obviously there is no point in crying over the proverbial spilled milk. The 2000s and 2010s are over. I am not trying to re-legislate those fights. Maybe the Taliban would have won the insurgency regardless of Pakistani actions (doubtful, but let's stipulate). Maybe the Iraq war ensured U.S. efforts in Afghanistan were doomed to fail either way (I've made this case in the past). 

So forget all that. Right now, all I'm trying to do is draw attention to the equation

Security benefits of backing Taliban > 50k deaths + pissing off world's biggest superpower + pissing off a(nother) neighbor

I don't want to focus on the ">" part of the equation, which is what most of the debate in the 2000s and 2010s was about. Let's instead, for now, focus on the left-hand side of the ">". Namely, "Security benefits of backing Taliban." 

The Taliban were not just meant to help equalize an unequal regional balance of power vis-a-vis India. They were also, crucially, meant to address the jihadi terrorist threat in the former FATA, KP, and cities around Pakistan. And they were meant to be eternally grateful to their patrons and interlocutors in GHQ, thus ensuring a quiet western border. These were the promised benefits. Again, we have the record. This is what important people said at the time. 

So how's that going? Well, here's how much the Taliban are helping Pakistan neutralize the Indian threat 

And here's how much they're helping deal with the jihadi threat

And this is how grateful the Taliban feels to their erstwhile supporters

So yeah, not great. 

The point of this post is not to absolve the Taliban government's gross irresponsibility or aggressive behavior. To the contrary, I have a pretty big problem with them. They are a shitty actor even by the high regional standards of shitty geopolitical behavior. 

But then that's the point, isn't it? Those of us who have, and had, a problem with them said as much for a very long time. The people who didn't have a problem with them? They made some clear, falsifiable claims about the strategy of backing them. And guess what? They've been falsified.