The smoking, radiating ruin of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy
For many years during the height of the so-called War on Terror, GHQ defended its decision-making re: Afghanistan/the Taliban/the double game/"do more" with a three-fold argument: 1-Pakistan will be next to Afghanistan a lot longer than America will be in it 2-Given #1, maintaining leverage over, and control of, the ruling regime on the western border is in Pakistan's interests, mainly due to the existential threat emanating from the eastern one 3-The regime of choice to deliver the security benefits in #2 is the Taliban To recall, the main costs of the policy predicated on the above claims were (a) Pakistani lives (somewhere between fifty and one hundred thousand dead), (b) Pakistan's reputation in Afghanistan and amongst a new generation of ordinary Afghans, and (c) Pakistan's reputation in DC. No one, even at the time, was unaware of these costs. Indeed, there is very good evidence that GHQ was deeply cognizant of each of these costs and yet considered them wor...